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The excesses of legislation
by John Franks
A recent paper by the Law Society's 
Company Law Committee starts with the 
proposition that no government can 
escape responsibility for the quality of its 
legislation. It goes on to assert boldly that 




The argument is made that recent 
legislation such as the Companies Act 1989 
provides a case study of what is wrong 
with the methods of legislating and text
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preparation. As a committee made up 
primarily of practitioners and 
representatives of the organisations that 
operate the system the approach is, as is 
to be expected, pragmatic.
In the view of the Committee, 
legislation fails to achieve its objectives. 
Regulation is unduly complex and 
obscure; the manner in which the 
legislation is brought into force leads to 
confusion as to the state of the law. There 
is unacceptable delay.
It should be noted that the House of 
Commons had tabled 180 pages of 
amendments to the Companies Bill, 
many not discussed because the report 
stage was guillotined in the House of 
Lords. Lord Williams is quoted as saying:
'We on these Benches are tired of the 
House being used as a sort of legislative 
sausage machine ...' (Hansard, 7 
November 1989)
Food for thought, perhaps, for those 
now studying the proper role of the 
House of Lords in constitutional terms.
Various solutions are put forward by 
the Law Society, including a Royal 
Commission, the Law Commission, an 
advisory committee or a separate 
Company Law Commission, with 
preference, on balance, given to the last 
suggestion. The fact that one of the first
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Commissioners of the Law Commission 
was no less than Protessor Gower, 
unfortunately did nothing to make that 
body the leading light in company law. 
However, that may have something to do 
with stifling attitudes on the part of the 
Lord Chancellors, who eftectively
determine what the Law Commission can 
and cannot do.
In theory the position could and 
should have been different.
THE FOUNDATION OF 
COMPANY LAW
The underpinning of the development 
of company law in this half of the 
twentieth century was a thorough-going 
review under an eminent judge, 
establishing the principles that were then 
followed through by an Act which revised 
and consolidated company law. Thus the 
Cohen Committee (appointed in 1943) 
first reported in 1945 (Cmd. 6659), with 
an amending Act following in 1947 
(revising the 1929 Act) and the 
consolidating Act of 1948 coming into 
effect on 1 July 1948. All the problems of 
stop and start which plague practitioners 
today were avoided.
Twenty-four years later, Lord Jenkins 
was to review the 1948 Act and the 
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958. 
This Committee reported on 30 May 
1962 (CMD 1749). It also had to 
consider the registration of Business Names 
Act 1916. The Act to implement this was 
only passed in 1967.
However, by 1963, it was decided by 
that committee of the City great and 
good, the City Working Party, that Notes 
on Amalgamations of British Businesses, 
produced in 1958 at the suggestion of the 
Governor of the Bank of England, should 
be redefined. That resulted in the new
Revised Notes on Company Amalgamation and 
Merger (October 1963).
The Committee was reconvened in 
1967 because of:
'Public criticism of the conduct of certain 
takeover transactions'.
On 20 September 1967, the panel was 
established, with Sir Humphrey Minors 
as first chairman. The Code was 
completely rewritten and published on 
27 March 1968. It was not a legal code, 
and the principle was that:
'The spirit as well as the precise wording of 
these principles and of the ensuing rules 
should be observed. '
Notwithstanding the legal rights of a 
majority, anything done to oppress a 
minority (in the general and not only the 
legal sense of the words), was wholly 
unacceptable.
UNACCEPTABLE DELAY
A recent paper by the Law Society's 
Company Law Committee ... assert[s] boldly 
that company law is not of a high enough 
standard ... legislation fails to achieve its
o
objectives. Regulation is unduly complex and 
obscure; the manner in which the legislation 
is brought into force leads to confusion as to 
the state of the law. There is unacceptable 
delay.
FURTHER HINDRANCES
Another source of uncertainty 
concerns the principles of European 
harmonisation. Not only are there 
directives in being and in draft, but 
principles of European law are flowing up 
the Thames into the City, creating 
uncertainty as to the effect of the law.
The view of the Jenkins Committee 
and its predecessors was that it is 
undesirable to impose restrictions on the 
honest man in order to defeat an 
occasional wrongdoer. It is important not 
to place unreasonable fetters upon 
business which was conducted in an 
efficient and honest manner. Controls 
and regulations carried to excess can 
defeat their own object.
Thus, as the Law Society Committee 
points out, Butterworths' Company Law- 
Handbook (first edition)   before the 
Companies Act 1980, contained 462 pages, 25
Sec Susan Scott-Hunt s article on 
insider trading at p. 21
26
but the latest edition is 3,544 pages   and 
that does not include huge volumes of 
subsidiary legislation.
The problems seem to stem, in part, 
from the media, which has a touching 
faith in rules and regulations. Whenever 
some event occurs, there is a plethora of 
comment as to how the particular 
mischief occurred and the extent to 
which new rules are required.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The basic assumption of company law 
is shareholder democracy. This is 
underwritten by the voting rights of the
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shareholders who, in particular, can 
remove directors and appoint auditors.
In all companies where the directors 
(or some of them) hold a majority of the 
shares this democracy just does not work. 
Instead, for such companies there are 
principles of fair play, especially where 
the company is a public company with 
quoted shares. In practice, the audit 
system on which this so often depends 
has been seriously undermined by three 
factors:
  the board chooses the auditors and can 
propose their removal;
INSIDER DEALING
The market would be much improved by 
greater transparency. It would also benefit 
from the abolition of all the absurd rules 
about so-called 'insider dealing' which 
primarily benefit the professional dealers 
who have several hours' start over everyone 
else. Inside information can allow amateurs 
to get ahead of the professionals.
  since the introduction of competition 
for professional appointments, 
auditors take part in 'beauty contests' 
to get nominated and, in many cases, 
tender to get the job; and
  auditor firms often get other more 
remunerative work from the company 
if they enjoy good relations with 
management
If these practices were prohibited, 
much more could be left to simple 
statements of principles, and there coulcl 
be reversion to the 1948-type legislature, 
instead of detailed control by more 
ingenious devices to get round ever 
increasing fine mesh text.
Accordingly, on this view:
  auditors should be selected and 
removed on recommendation to the
shareholders by a company committee 
of say, seven, on which the board has 
only one representative; there is one 
representative of the staff (who is not a 
director) and one representative from 
the pension fund, if possible;
  it should be unprofessional conduct for 
auditors to compete for work by fee 
tendering; and
  auditors should not be allowed to be 
retained for any other work than the 
audit and the verification of tax 
returns. It should be unprofessional 
conduct for other work (including 
advice on tax planning) to be 
undertaken by the auditors or an 
associated company or firm.
It might also assist if the internal 
auditor were required to report to such a 
committee when needed.
Another controversial proposal is the 
suggestion that employees should have 
representatives on the board. This is 
advocated by larger companies in Europe 
but is not likely in itself to be seen to be 
a solution by English public companies.
DIRECTORS
There is also the problem that 
directorship has become an executive 
function. The idea of management 
working for and reporting to, a board 
made up of the great and the good has 
long since gone, the exception perhaps 
being league football companies. What is 
more, executive directors used to protect 
themselves by long-term contracts. This 
at least meant companies could ensure 
their key people were really committed. 
But because of fundamental resentment 
fostered by the media, long contracts are 
out. Result? Huge sums are required in 
terms of fees, incentives and benefits for 
joining and/or leaving a company, 
because there is no tenure.
The cost of changing and keeping 
directors has become a very real 
problem. The cure seems to be worse 
than the disease. Shareholders may 
require directors to invest in the 
company and expect their rewards to be 
directly linked to the results achieved for 
the shareholders; unlike the employed 
executives who manage the company.
GREATER TRANSPARENCY
The great mischief caused to all
O
companies by the Inland Revenue 
practice of valuing work in progress and 
unsold products to compute profits for 
taxation is long overdue for review. Most
investors do not realise how often their 
companies are brought to breaking point 
because of this practice of assessing 
unrealised, and perhaps unrealisable, 
profits. There is also a matching set of 
mischiefs produced by accounting 
standards which are slanted against the 
inclusion of goodwill and trademarks as 
assets, whilst assets and liabilities are 
constantly being restated to reflect so- 
called current values.
Most ordinary investors would find it 
useful to have the historic costs shown in
MEDIA ROLE
The problems seem to stem from, in part, 
the media, which has a touching faith in rules 
and regulations. Whenever some event 
occurs, there is a plethora of comment as to 
how the particular mischief occurred and the 
extent to which new rules are required.
notes against the current values. Another 
helpful provision would be the inclusion 
of figures, reflecting the active value of 
property, to contrast ^vith the written 
down value required by accounting 
principles.
The market would be much improved 
by greater transparency. It would also 
benefit from the abolition of all the 
absurd rules about so-called 'insider 
dealing' which primarily benefit the 
professional dealers who have several 
hours' start over everyone else. Inside 
information can allow amateurs to get 
ahead of the professionals.
Indeed, the professionals are 
the chief proponents of penalties against 
those acting with inside information.
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What is needed is a new Cohen 
Committee and a five-year stand-still on 
all new primary and subordinate 
legislature, in order to introduce 
comprehensive change using simplified 
language, consolidated into a single Act 
which comes wholly into effect in one fell 
swoop. Sy
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